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ABSTRACT: Cost-Benefit Analysis is a method to assess the effects of policies and projects on social welfare. 
CBAs are usually applied in a top-down approach, in the sense that a decision-making body first decides on 
which policies or projects are to be considered, and then applies a set of uniform criteria to identifying and 
valuing relevant cost and benefit flows. This paper investigates the possible advantages, prerequisites and 
limitations of applying CBA in what may be considered an alternative, “bottom-up” manner. Instead of starting 
out with a pre-defined policy option, the suggested approach begins with the underlying environmental 
problem, and then assesses costs and benefits of strategies and solutions as identified by local and directly 
affected stakeholders. For empirical case studies concerning two river catchments in Sweden and Latvia, the 
bottom-up CBA approach utilises local knowledge, assesses plans which are not only developed for local 
conditions but are also likely to be more acceptable to local society, and sheds additional light on possible 
distributional effects. By not only benefitting from, but also supporting participative environmental planning, 
bottom-up CBA is in line with the growing trend of embedding stakeholder participation within environmental 
policy and decision-making.   
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1 INTRODUCTION  
By accounting for market and non-market costs and benefits, Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is a method to assess 
the effects of policies and projects on social welfare. In CBA, all costs and benefits are monetarised and 
translated into a single number, the net present value (NPV). This index is usually interpreted in a 
straightforward manner: a positive NPV means that the social benefits outweigh the social costs of the 
assessed policy or project. Implementation of the policy or project is thus justified as it represents an efficient 
reallocation of resources that increases social welfare. Moreover, NPVs can be used to consistently rank a set 
of mutually-exclusive alternatives. Together with its theoretical foundation in welfare economics through the 
Kaldor-Hicks compensation test, these features make CBA a highly demanded and widely applied approach to 
policy and project evaluation world-wide (Hanley & Barbier, 2009). CBA outcomes are used in the policy 
development process and as a driver of regulatory decision-making, although rarely as the single decision 
criterion (Atkinson et al., 2018). 
 
Usually, a CBA is applied as top-down approach, meaning a central decision-making body (such as a Finance 
ministry) issues guidance on which policies or projects are assessed, and on how the costs and benefits to 
society are to be identified and then measured. In this paper, we contribute to the literature by suggesting a 
bottom-up CBA approach as an alternative. A bottom-up CBA, we argue, allows a more informed development 
of regulatory policies. Instead of starting with a policy or project option, this approach begins with an 
environmental problem, and then assesses costs and benefits of strategies identified by “local” stakeholders 
in pursuit of addressing this problem. While a top-down CBA can be used to assess the trade-offs of an already-
defined set of projects or policies, the bottom-up approach takes advantage of additional case-specific 
knowledge, and assesses strategies which might be more likely to be accepted by the local society, and are 
better adapted to local conditions. For instance, drawing on local insights can provide information that is 
otherwise not available to decision-making bodies, and may improve the integration of wider societal goals 
into policy decisions (Pellizzoni, 2003; Perni & Martínez-Paz, 2013; Wright & Fritsch, 2011). Current studies 
also find that participation fosters trust, and increases understanding and acceptance in the project and 
decision progress among the stakeholders (Fischer et al., 2014). This can be due to the enhanced transparency 
when developing a decision-support tool for environmental management (Oliver et al., 2017), or when 
incorporating stakeholder interests into water management plans (Kochskämper et al., 2016). Moreover, 
bottom-up CBA facilitates disclosure and discussion of distributional concerns to be considered in policy 
development. Distributional concerns are not the primary focus of top-down CBA (Hahn & Tetlock, 2008), yet 
are seen by some as an essential factor to enhance social acceptance of policy decisions (Hall et al., 2013). By 
not only benefitting from, but also encouraging and supporting stakeholder engagement, bottom-up CBA is in 
line with the growing trend of embedding stakeholder participation into environmental policy and decision-
making (Koontz & Newig, 2014; Pascoe & Dichmont, 2017), for instance in the context of water management 
(Michels, 2016). 
 
Setting the system boundaries is a decisive step of every CBA and of crucial importance for the results and 
recommendations that are obtained (e.g. Pearce et al., 2006). System boundaries establish the terms of 
reference, referring to both the scope of the object of assessment (the project), and the population whose 
well-being should be considered. Typically, the latter consists of a national population. In the bottom-up 
approach, the focus is on selecting those stakeholders whose strategies and preferences in terms of an 
environmental problem are to be analysed. In doing so, a balance of arguments is needed to enable practical 
feasibility for the bottom-up approach. First, it needs to be ensured that the boundaries are set in a way that 
a changing environmental condition primarily affects the welfare of the population within the spatial system, 
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while possible impacts outside the system are secondary at the most and therefore, in this context, deemed 
negligible. Second, the boundaries need to allow the inclusion of all groups with areas of responsibility directly 
connected to the environmental problem, which therefore embody these key agents who should be involved 
in addressing the problem. While consideration of different groups ensures the capturing of diverse interests 
and solution options, the inclusion of directly affected agents ensures that those who are most affected by a 
project get to participate in its appraisal and in implementing solutions, creating a sense of ownership to 
solutions which is likely to increase the chances of successful problem solving.  
 
In this paper a bottom-up CBA approach is proposed, and then illustrated using two case studies (the Helge 
and Berze river catchments, located in Sweden and Latvia respectively). Local stakeholders suggested 
strategies to solve issues related to the supply of ecosystem services, which are commonly defined as the 
benefits people obtain from ecosystems (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005). Assessing effects in terms 
of their change in supply is widely applied in environmental planning and policy-making (Dick et al., 2018), and 
offers a holistic framework which has the potential to shift the awareness towards considering multiple 
services in decision-making (Posner et al., 2016; Stosch et al., 2017). Even though the ecosystem service 
approach itself is perceived as useful by the majority of stakeholders when managing water resources 
(Grizzetti, Liquete, et al., 2016), preferences in terms of which services should be prioritised naturally differ 
across stakeholder groups and interests (Butler et al., 2013; Micha et al., 2018). While CBA in general is an 
ideal tool to reveal how different priorities and trade-offs influence the societal welfare, the bottom-up CBA 
also sheds light on which ecosystem services are seen as important and are thus prioritised by stakeholders in 
the local context.  
 
After providing a background on CBA in Section 2, the potential role of bottom-up CBA in environmental 
planning, and the associated conditions Fto ensure its validity and practicability are outlined in Section 3. In 
Section 4 we empirically investigate the application of bottom-up CBA based on the two case studies, followed 
by the discussion of the results in Section 5. In Section 6, the circumstances under which bottom-up or top-
down CBA approaches should be preferred are discussed, whilst conclusions follow in Section 7. 
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2 CBA AND THE POLICY PROCESS 
In the history of CBA, opinions are divided over whether the outcome of the CBA is the decision or just an 
input to decision making. There has also been much discussion over whether it is the preferences of individuals 
(consumer sovereignty) or decision-making agents (political sovereignty) which should be relevant for decision 
making (cf. Banzhaf, 2009). CBAs are usually conducted in what we refer to here as a top-down approach. This 
means that a central decision-making body decides on the set of policies or projects to be assessed, which 
costs and benefits to society are to be considered, and these impacts should be valued. For instance Arrow et 
al. (1996) stress that “values […] assigned to program effects […] should be those of affected individuals” (p. 
222), yet argue that, in order to compare the evaluated regulatory decisions across multiple areas of 
government (e.g. health, transport, energy), there is a need of overall consistency in terms of which impacts 
to include and what prices to use to value them, which implies a top-down approach. This means that, even 
though it ensures a degree of participation due to the assumption of consumer sovereignty, a conventional 
CBA does not usually allow those parties impacted by the project to have much influence over the process 
(Pearce et al., 2006).  
 
The influence of CBA in real-world decision-making is somewhat limited, yet is the method increasingly used 
as a tool to inform public policy decisions (Hahn & Tetlock, 2008; Hockley, 2014; Pearce et al., 2006). Hahn and 
Tetlock (2008) identify an important contribution of CBA in the process of policy development by preventing 
the adoption of “economically unsound regulations” (p.79) and by eliminating “obviously bad proposals” 
(Hockley, 2014, p. 285). Atkinson et al. (2018) have also emphasised the role of CBA within regulatory decision-
making.  
 
Besides of its straightforward interpretation and the possibility of including impacts that might otherwise be 
ignored (Sunstein, 2000), ex-ante CBAs come not only with a high data demand, relying on predictions of future 
variables and estimations of monetary values of non-market goods, but also with the equally challenging 
problem of quantifying the physical effects of a project. Bertram et al. (2014), amongst others, argue that 
closing all existing data gaps needed for a comprehensive CBA is not achievable, and that relying on current 
data does not resolve underlying uncertainties. Due to practical and methodological challenges of 
environmental valuation, Klauer et al. (2016) consider a full-scale CBA to be warranted only in a sub-set of 
cases. Finally, it has been observed that a “lack of participation can easily engender opposition to a project or 
policy, making it difficult to implement and costly to reverse”, while greater “[p]articipation may . . . produce 
better policy and project design” (Pearce et al., 2006, p. 285). However, top-down CBA does not do much to 
encourage such participation. An alternative way would be the use of a bottom-up CBA approach. By extending 
the conception of consumer sovereignty, it is possible to take on board not only the preferences or choice of 
affected individuals regarding the valuation of impacts, but also regarding their preferences in terms of 
strategies of how these impacts can be best managed.  
 
3 AN ALTERNATIVE: “BOTTOM-UP CBA” 
Instead of starting with a policy decision, a bottom-up approach analyses the “multitude of actors who interact 
at the operational (local) level on a particular problem or issue” and focuses on the “strategies pursued by 
various actors in pursuit of their objectives” (Sabatier, 1986, p. 22). Such problems or issues therefore serve as 
the starting point of a bottom-up approach, and thus determine the relevant actors. Being commonly accepted 
as one component in environmental planning  (Human & Davies, 2010; Koontz & Newig, 2014), the benefits 
of including local stakeholders in policy planning processes go beyond its democratic value and the possibilities 
5 
 
of describing societal values in an improved way (Beierle & Konisky, 2001; Fischer et al., 2014). There is 
evidence that bottom-up approaches may result in advantages in terms of information and implementation. 
These merits can for instance emerge due to the increased transparency of such a participatory process (Oliver 
et al., 2017), or due to harnessing local knowledge, information that may otherwise not be available to 
decision-makers (Perni & Martínez-Paz, 2013), which in turn enhances innovation, effectiveness, acceptance 
or trustworthiness amongst stakeholders (Beierle & Konisky, 2001; Graversgaard et al., 2017; Ostrom, 2010). 
Participative planning is also in line with political guidelines such as the Water Framework Directive or Principle 
11 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Convention on Biological Diversity, 1993; European Commission, 
2003). 
 
Focusing on a specific environmental problem, a bottom-up CBA approach enables local stakeholders to 
discuss their knowledge, views, preferences and perceptions of the problem, and to subsequently suggest 
problem-solving strategies. The costs and benefits of the suggested strategies, as experienced and perceived 
by the stakeholders, are then assessed and fed back into the participatory process. Stakeholders could then 
discuss the outcome of the CBA, and accordingly re-evaluate, validate and potentially adjust their suggestions 
for problem solving strategies. Such a bottom-up CBA approach would allow stakeholders to not only decide 
upon (i) the strategies to be assessed, but also (ii) which impacts should be considered as relevant for the 
welfare of the respective society. By contrast, in a top-down approach, both decisions (i) and (ii) are left to 
external experts (cf. Arrow et al., 1996).  
 
3.1 CONDITIONS FOR USING BOTTOM-UP CBA 
We argue that the validity and practicability of bottom-up CBA rests on meeting three main conditions, which 
are now outlined.  
 
Condition 1: No pre-defined choices  
In line with the underlying assumption that local stakeholders decide upon the best set of candidate actions 
to address an environmental problem which will be included in the CBA, the first condition is that such actions 
(that is, possible projects or policies) are not pre-defined by the analyst or regulator. This condition is crucial 
to achieve the main objectives of the bottom-up approach, which are (1) to generate strategies to address an 
environmental problem which represent the preferences of local stakeholders and are formulated within and 
adapted to the context of local conditions, as well as (2) to reveal the costs and benefits of these strategies as 
experienced and perceived by the affected actors.  
 
Condition 2: Identification of relevant stakeholders 
The results obtained from the bottom-up CBA are dependent upon the input of the selected stakeholders, 
who are known as having diverse interests and to perceive problems differently (Micha et al., 2018). Therefore, 
identifying who the stakeholders consist of in each case is key. Current literature differentiates between a 
normative and strategic definition of stakeholders, also framed as the distinction between the (wider) public 
and stakeholders (Colvin et al., 2016; Soma & Vatn, 2014). While the first classification describes all actors who 
take some interest in the analysed problem (e.g. Fischer et al., 2014), the latter includes stakeholders who can 
affect or are affected by the problem most directly (e.g. Aanesen et al., 2014).  
 
Compared to top-down CBA, which usually asses the change in welfare to society as a whole and thus follows 
the national population stakeholder definition, the subject of the analysis in the bottom-up approach is how 
affected stakeholders prefer to deal with an environmental problem, which therefore dictates the set of 
stakeholders (Reed et al., 2009). The second condition, to include all stakeholders who are relevant to the 
environmental problem, consequently emphasises the strategic understanding of relevant stakeholders. 
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Building on Freeman (1984) and Savage et al. (1991), this group comprises individuals, groups or other 
organisations that can affect or are affected by either the environmental problem or its resolution. This 
includes economic actors with agency, along with victims and beneficiaries impacted by (i) the environmental 
problem itself, (ii) the changing condition of the problem, or (iii) the suggested strategies producing such a 
change.   
 
Depending on the subject of the analysis, the number of stakeholders meeting this condition may, however, 
still be very high (Billgren & Holmén, 2008; Colvin et al., 2016), and so for practical reasons only a sub-set can 
be included in the process. Nevertheless, if the included stakeholders do not represent the interests of the 
society at large, i.e. every stakeholder matching the second condition, neither will the outcome of the CBA. To 
ensure the completeness of interests when limiting the number of participants, who comes forward as being 
representative of each stakeholder group should be carefully considered. Dealing with an environmental 
problem, this may include participants from farmers' unions, environmental NGOs, local agencies or other 
interest groups, reflecting diverse interests and stakes in the problem. Nevertheless, if the number of relevant 
participants is unfeasibly large, there might be a need to define additional criteria, such as geographical, 
demographic (Reed et al., 2009) or, due to the complexity of ecosystems, impact-related boundaries. Such 
restrictions, however, come with limitations for the bottom-up CBA, which will be revisited in the third 
condition. 
 
To be able to react to emerging findings during the participative process, for instance if strategies developed 
as part of the bottom-up CBA process to address the environmental problem have an effect on or are affected 
by new stakeholders, the analysis requires a dynamic process where stakeholders can continuously be added 
or replaced. In general, the selection can be done by different means, such as stakeholder mapping (Bryson, 
2004), focus group interviews, snowball sampling or social network analyses (Reed et al., 2009), as well as 
geographical footprints or self-selection (Colvin et al., 2016). 
 
Condition 3: Representative scale   
In order to ensure that selected stakeholders fully represent all parties who are directly connected to the 
environmental problem but also that not “too many” parties participate to make the process un-workable, it 
may be necessary to restrict the geographic scale of a bottom-up CBA. This can be problematic for two reasons.  
First, many environmental problems are characterized by complexity and transboundary impacts, and are 
therefore likely to affect social welfare beyond customarily-defined system boundaries which will often be 
administrative borders (Stosch et al., 2017). For instance, emissions of a coal-fired power plant can have an 
impact on regional air pollution. CBA, however, considers only impacts occurring and being identified by the 
stakeholders within the defined boundaries which will often be delineated by municipality, regional or country 
borders. Impacts outside the defined system boundary will thus be neglected, even if they occur as a result of 
the (non-)implementation of strategies within the system boundaries, such as an improved filter on the power 
plant, or a law allowing to keep it in operation without any changes. Second, use or non-use values of goods 
or bads which are generated within the system boundaries, yet are held by actors outside the boundaries, may 
be neglected.  
 
The third condition consequently implies that bottom-up CBA may only be considered as sufficiently 
comprehensive if (i) the defined system boundaries allow the inclusion of all relevant stakeholder groups, as 
defined in the second condition, (ii) most of the costs and benefits are experienced or held by people within 
the defined system boundaries, and (iii) impacts outside the system are marginal. We refer to such a situation 
as achieving a useable representative scale. 
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If conditions (1) – (3) cannot be met, it may still be both practical and useful to undertake a partial, bottom-
up CBA. This may apply if the main intention is to use bottom-up CBA as a tool to support stakeholder 
participation, or if the fields of application are environmental matters with apparent and significant national 
or international non-use values which, however, come at a cost for local actors.  
 
3.2 THE ROLE OF BOTTOM-UP CBA   
Following Hockley (2014, p. 289), who noted that “[d]emand for CBA will be highest if it helps decision makers 
deliver consequences demanded by citizens and/or if citizens directly incentivise its use”, CBA can be an ideal 
tool to foster participative environmental planning when the stakeholders themselves support the process 
and the outcome of the CBA. These symbiotic characteristics are more likely associated with bottom-up than 
with top-down CBA, and may result in practicable, targeted and widely-accepted policy recommendations with 
clear implications regarding their possible impact on society’s welfare. Drawing on the mechanisms describing 
possible impacts on the output quality of participatory environmental planning, as summarised by 
Kochskämper et al. (2016), the role of bottom-up CBA in terms of the integration of local knowledge, 
stakeholder dialogue, and acceptance is outlined below. Furthermore, the role of CBA in integrating bottom-
up outcomes into policy making is addressed.  
 
Integration of local knowledge  
By assessing costs and benefits of strategies suggested by different stakeholder groups in pursuit of targeting 
self-identified pressures related to an environmental problem, the integration of local knowledge is the 
linchpin of a bottom-up approach. Stakeholders can provide much context-specific information, which might 
go beyond the knowledge of external or high-level experts (Kochskämper et al., 2016; Perni & Martínez-Paz, 
2013). Their experience with local settings is particularly beneficial due to the high degree of heterogeneity in 
local environmental conditions. It is therefore believed that local stakeholders can identify case-specific 
pressures more accurately, and have a deeper understanding of the practicability and performance of possible 
response strategies. Besides identifying possible solutions, stakeholder input can relate to determining which 
benefits and costs are most relevant, as well as their values. Furthermore, they may be better informed about 
the range of possible direct and opportunity costs of the strategies if they would affect their professional or 
interest areas (e.g. impacts on agricultural land quality).  
 
Stakeholder dialogue  
By definition, one would expect stakeholders to prioritise their own wellbeing over a broader society’s welfare. 
However, by developing a better understanding of each other's interests and preferences, stakeholders are 
more likely to develop new solutions that maximize mutual gains, often including environmental benefits 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Brody, 2003; Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Kochskämper et al., 2016). Environmental 
concerns are nevertheless subjected to and frequently offset by competing interests, both within and outside 
a participative planning process (Albert et al., 2017; Kochskämper et al., 2016). An economic perspective can 
support the integration of the values of nature conservation into decision-making (Albert et al., 2017) due to 
two crucial attributes of CBAs. First, multiple impacts which emerge from implementing certain strategies can 
be considered. Second, monetary valuation can be “a pragmatic tool to guide analysis and to allow informed 
comparisons” (Sunstein, 2000, p. 1094). As cost and benefit values are expressed in comparable and consistent 
terms both across stakeholders and over time, a bottom-up CBA enables stakeholders to consider impacts 
beyond those most apparent for one interest group yet not necessarily visible to another. In other words, by 
drawing on monetary terms detached from interests, the discussion may not only be about determining the 
most important impacts, but also about finding strategies with impacts generating the highest overall benefits.  
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A participatory process is no guarantee that the different involved interest groups will necessarily agree on 
strategies, as evidenced by Kochskämper et al. (2016). However, “CBA is a way of encouraging people to think 
about, describe and then measure the multiple impacts of different policies and projects in a consistent manner. 
In principle, this can be done in a very transparent way which encourages debates over the important 
parameters of a decision” (Hanley & Barbier, 2009, p. 308). While, from a CBA point of view, it is objectively 
evident whether a strategy benefits society or not, these very discussions shed light on the preferences and 
reasons for aversion by single stakeholders or groups. Disagreement can for instance occur regarding the 
practicability of suggested actions, or the reasonability and valuation of the impact assumptions. Stakeholders 
might agree with the assumptions regarding an action, yet disagree with the implementation (from an 
executor point of view) or non-implementation (from a victim or beneficiary point of view). Such cases would 
occur if private costs exceed private benefits. Consequently, the CBA process facilitates disclosure and triggers 
discussions of the distributional effects of costs and benefits. Furthermore, by assuming that the stakeholder 
participation is embedded in a process with delegated power to influence decisions such as the participatory 
planning of the Water Framework Directive, one could imagine that presenting strategies with a demonstrably 
negative NPV (which might indicate disproportional costs of the action) would decrease the likelihood of their 
implementation. Bottom-up CBA as such would encourage stakeholders to reconsider and search for better 
solutions than are currently on offer. 
 
Wider acceptance and better implementation 
A participative planning process fosters dialogue amongst various interest groups and may therefore support 
outcomes with an increased acceptance by both stakeholders and policy makers (Kochskämper et al. (2016) 
and references therein). By ensuring early involvement and increasing transparency, both listed by Rowe and 
Frewer (2000) as evaluation criteria of participation processes, a bottom-up CBA can support the building of 
trust and acceptance amongst stakeholders, for instance in terms of the costs and benefits identified as 
relevant by other stakeholders, or of the development process of such a decision-support tool in general 
(Oliver et al., 2017). By revealing “different, often opposite, views and interests regarding a problem” and 
converting them into coherent and comparable units, the CBA can contribute in “making problem definitions 
more adequate and broadly supported” (Bulkeley & Mol, 2003, p. 151). In addition to supporting the 
generation of acceptance, the CBA itself reflects the outcome of the participation, and thus pictures (to some 
extent) accepted strategies.  
 
4 EMPIRICAL CASE STUDIES 
To empirically assess the process of bottom-up CBA, we applied this method in two case examples. Both cases, 
the Helge River in Sweden and the Berze River in Latvia, experience issues related to water quality, which 
constitutes the focal environmental problem of the bottom-up CBA. Both catchments require actions to 
improve the water quality. Table 1 provides a brief overview of the characteristics of the two case examples. 
 
Table 1 Case study areas 
 Berze River catchment (Latvia) Helge River catchment (Sweden) 
Country Latvia  Sweden 
Area   904 km2  4 725 km²  
Inhabitants 26,500 (50 % in urban areas) 131,000 (97 % in urban areas) 
Land use 50 % agriculture, 42 % forest 65 % forest, 15 % cropland, 7 % grazing land, 2 % urban area 
Identified water quality problems 
according to the Water Framework 
Directive 
Bad and poor ecological quality 
with respect to nutrients 
Eutrophication of surface water due to phosphorus and 
nitrogen. Some waters have problem with heavy metals 
(mercury) 
Source: BONUS MIRACLE (2015) 
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The application of bottom-up CBA is desirable in both examples for two reasons. First, as evidenced by the EU 
Water Framework Directive or the Marine Strategy Framework Directive, there is a demand for both CBA and 
stakeholder involvement in cases like this1. Second, over-exploitation of water resources is a typical example 
for a market failure, which, for instance in the case of eutrophication, leads to insufficient incentives to reduce 
nutrient discharge. By internalising costs and benefits, the CBA can reveal this market failure and be used to 
assess possible remedies.  
 
The bottom-up CBA development process included several stakeholder workshops in both case areas, in 
which the assessed costs and benefits of suggested strategies, the strategies themselves, and the 
stakeholder composition were discussed, adjusted and validated ( 
Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1 Bottom-up CBA development process 
 
 
System Boundaries and selected stakeholders 
The geographical and hydrological river catchments were set as system boundaries for the bottom-up CBA, to 
facilitate the cooperation of all relevant actors (European Commission, 2016). Most of the impacts of potential 
actions occur within the respective catchments. Selected stakeholders were directly connected to either the 
water quality of the respective river catchment, or to management strategies developed throughout the CBA 
process (Table 2). It is notable that the Berze River case included a high share of public sector participants of 
centralised institutions, whereas the stakeholder groups in the Helge River case consisted mainly of 
decentralised institutions. 
 
Table 2 Represented stakeholder groups and agencies 
Stakeholder Group Agencies (Helge)  Agencies (Berze) 
Public Sector  Water Association, Helge River 
 District Council, Kristianstad  
 Swedish Forest Agency  
 Initiative Model Forest in Helge å  
 Environment Committee, District of 
Hässleholm  
 Nature Management School in Osby  
 Municipal Office of Osby   
 Ministry of Environmental Protection and 
Regional Development 
 State Environmental Services  
 Ministry of Agriculture 
 Rural Support Service 
 Latvian Environment, Geology and 
Meteorology Centre 
 Health Inspectorate 
 Municipalities 
                                                          
1 For instance, the Water Framework Directive emphasises the role of both public participation and economic analyses to balance the 
various interests and increase enforceability (European Commission, 2016). It thereby suggests CBA as one way of identifying 
disproportionate costs (European Commission, 2009). The EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive requires member states to 
conduct CBAs before new measures are implemented (European Commission, 2008). 
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 County Councils, Jelgava and Dobele 
Civil Society  Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation (SSNC), Kristianstad 
 Swedish Society for Nature 
Conservation (SSNC), Kronoberg  
 Latvian Fund for Nature 
 Baltic Environmental Forum 
Private Sector  Farmers  
 Forest-Owner association 
 Regito Research Center on Water and 
Health 
 Farmers Parliament and Farmers 
 Hydropower plant Operators  
 Wastewater treatment plant operators   
 Property Management Group 
 
Management Strategies 
Following the bottom-up approach, the stakeholders first identified pressures which they perceive as causal 
factors of poor water quality within the system. Reaching a common ground on these pressures sets a 
framework for the strategies to reduce such pressures, as subsequently suggested by the stakeholders. Based 
on the inputs of the stakeholders, the relevant benefits of management actions in terms of ecosystem services 
which are compromised by the pressures were identified as illustrated in Figure 2 and 3. Based on the 
identified pressures, the stakeholders suggested and then discussed strategies consisting of various measures 
which would, in their opinion, reduce these pressures and thus affect the environmental problem positively. 
The exact measures and their scope are outlined in the Table 3 and 4.  
Due to their preference to focus on the short- and medium-term over the longer-term implications, the 
stakeholders decided to set the time horizon for analysis as from now to 2030, which means that only costs 
and benefits occurring during this period will be considered in the subsequent CBA.  
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Figure 2 Assessment Framework, Helge River catchment.  
 
Source: Own figure (inspired by Bertram et al., 2014; Grizzetti, Lanzanova, et al., 2016) 
 
Figure 3 Assessment Framework, Berze River catchment 
 
Source: Own figure (inspired by Bertram et al., 2014; Grizzetti, Lanzanova, et al., 2016) 
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As part of the process, it was necessary to establish a baseline (“business as usual” scenario) which reflects 
the current and future status of the environmental condition without additional societal response (Börger et 
al., 2017). Table 3 presents the baseline and possible future strategies suggested by the stakeholders. The 
baseline shows the measures related to water quality which are already or will be implemented to the end of 
the current EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) period in 2021. This includes measures of the first and second 
pillar of the CAP, the Water Framework Directive, and, in the case of the Helge River, measures by the County 
Administration and the municipalities. The alternative strategies represent potential additional measures, as 
suggested by the local stakeholders. To allow for comparisons, the baseline measures are assumed to continue 
until 2030, while the potential measures are assumed to be implemented in 2021 and last until 2030.  
 
In the Helge River case area, the developed set of strategies are not mutually exclusive as they focus on 
different areas of the river. The suggested measures are reported in Table 3. While the measures of the first 
strategy (“River”) focus on the restoration of the aquatic ecosystems, the second strategy (“Forest”) targets 
sustainable water management in forestry, which is the dominant land use practice and seen as a major source 
of nutrients and organic matters discharge.  
 
Table 3 Stakeholder-suggested strategies and measures, Helge River catchment 
Measures Scope Unit 
Baseline strategy 
Liming  
by doser  4262 tons/year  
by boat 674 tons/year  
by air 366 tons/year  
Buffer strips 181  ha  
Wetlands  210  ha  
Individual sewage emission  
Reduction to normal level 5431  facilities  
Reduction from normal to high level 1657  facilities  
Non-productive field margins in agricultural landscape  300  ha  
Upgrade or removal of traditional water regulating dams   78  units  
Strategy 1 “River” 
Stormwater ponds 15 ha 
Flood plains 150 ha 
Wetlands 597 ha 
Phosphorus wetlands 59 ha 
Riparian zones 400 ha 
Re-meandering   83 km 
Strategy 2 “Forest” 
Restoring wet forests 35,000 ha 
Transition from coniferous to broadleaved forest 500 ha 
Riparian zones in forest landscape  600 ha 
Fishway or removal of 
migration obstacle  
Size 1 3 m 
Size 2 184 m 
Size 3 31 units 
Culvert replacement 4 units 
 
By contrast, the strategies developed for the Berze River catchment, reported in Table 4, focus on specific 
pressures. These relate to separate stakeholder groups and consist of fewer measures. The first strategy 
(“WWTP”) aims to decrease point source pollution due to discharges from wastewater treatment plants 
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(WWTP), while the second strategy (“Agriculture”) targets diffuse pollution by reducing nutrient run-off from 
agricultural land. Due to diverse stakeholder preferences, two alternative versions of the second strategy were 
developed; While all other measures are alike, the width of the ecological buffer strips along the main stem is 
10 meters in Strategy 2a, and 5 meters in Strategy 2b. The objective of the third strategy (“Hydropower”) is to 
decrease the pressure of water regulation due to hydropower plants.  
 
Table 4 Stakeholder-suggested strategies and measures, Berze River catchment 
Measures Scope Unit  
Baseline strategy 
Crop diversification  41,134     ha  
Ecological focus areas  2,930     ha  
Perennial grasslands  1,201     ha  
Organic farming  1,305     ha  
Strategy 1 “WWTP” 
Rural WWTPs [100 - 300 PE] 3     units  
Strategy 2a “Agriculture” 
Ecological buffer strips [2 + 10 m] 741     ha  
Sedimentation ponds 4     ha  
Optimisation of fertilizer use – 20% reduction of mineral fertilizer application 32,320     ha  
Strategy 2b “Agriculture”  
Ecological buffer strips [2 + 5 m] 540     ha  
Sedimentation ponds 4     ha  
Optimisation of fertilizer use – 20% reduction of mineral fertilizer application 32,320     ha  
Strategy 3 “Hydropower” 
Fishways 5     units  
 
Identification of Physical Impacts of the Strategies 
While results for the mitigation of nutrients exist for the respective measures and catchments (Table 5 and 
Table 6), expert elicitation was used to assess the likely impacts in terms of the additional ecosystem services 
(Table 7 and 8). The experts chosen for assessing the qualitative impacts on ecosystem services are researchers 
from the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and Linköping University (LIU) for the Helge River catchment, 
and from the University of Latvia for the Berze River catchment. All of them were involved in projects covering 
the respective catchment. The assessment is therefore based on both scientific knowledge (e.g. Maes et al. 
(2016) or the NWRM catalogue2) and experience with the respective catchment. Since this assessment may 
be considered a qualified guess that is inherently uncertain, we chose a qualitative ranking of the relative 
impact according to a negative, none, low, medium or high impact. Furthermore, the impact on the whole 
catchment is considered, i.e. the spatial scale of the measure is taken into account. The rating describes the 
experts' overall assessment of the likely impacts caused to the implementation of the strategies, compared to 
no implementation (Table 7 and 8).  
 
Table 5 Total nutrient mitigation at the river outlet, Helge River catchment 
 Total N reduction (in kg/year) Total P reduction (in kg/year) 
Baseline  18,077 2,083 
Strategy 1 “River” 88,089 5,563 
Strategy 2 “Forest” 4,500 135 
Source: MIRACLE project results  
                                                          
2 http://nwrm.eu/measures-catalogue 
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Table 6 Total nutrient mitigation at the river outlet, Berze River catchment 
 Total N reduction (in kg/year) Total P reduction (in kg/year) 
Baseline 2,115 79 
Strategy 1 “WWTP” 687 184 
Strategy 2a “Agriculture” 86,474 2,654 
Strategy 2b “Agriculture” 86,474 2,455 
Strategy 3 “Hydropower” 0 0 
Source: MIRACLE project results  
 
Table 7 Experts' rating of impacts in Helge River catchment 
 Ecosystem Service Baseline Strategy 1 “River” Strategy 2 “Forest” 
Biodiversity/habitat preservation Medium Medium High 
Flood risk reduction Low Medium High 
Erosion/sediment control Medium Medium High 
Recreation and tourism High High Medium 
Improved surface and groundwater quality  Medium Medium High 
 
Table 8  Experts' rating of impacts in Berze River catchment 
 
Valuing Impacts  
Whenever original benefit information is missing, CBA can make use of benefits transfer methods (value 
transfer). Czajkowski et al. (2017) find that in the context of water quality in the Baltic Sea region, an income 
adjusted value transfer performs the best of those considered. Consequently, the following formula was used 
to transfer benefits in the two case studies to express environmental impacts of the prospective measures in 
monetary terms: 
 
𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 = 𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦 (
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑦
)
𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦
 
[1.1] 
 
An income elasticity value of unity was applied, since several studies have found this to lead to the lowest 
transfer errors (Barton, 2002; Czajkowski et al., 2017; Czajkowski & Ščasný, 2010; Lindhjem & Navrud, 2015; 
Pearce, 2006). Income is based on the gross domestic product per inhabitant at 2016 market prices, as 
indicated by the European Commission (2017). Furthermore, as valuation studies often measure the 
willingness to pay for a positive (or negative) change versus the status quo, the experts’ rating scales, 
consisting of five levels was used. This was accomplished as shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9 Conversion legend  
 
 
 
 
 
 Ecosystem Service Baseline 
Strategy 1 
“WWTP” 
Strategy 2a 
“Agriculture” 
Strategy 2b 
“Agriculture” 
Strategy 3 
“Hydropower” 
Biodiversity/habitat preservation Low Low High Medium High 
Flood risk reduction Low None/Negligible Medium Medium Low 
Erosion/sediment control Medium None/Negligible High High None/Negligible 
Recreation and tourism None/Negligible Low Medium Medium High 
Improved surface and groundwater quality  Low Low Medium Medium None 
Valuation Study Rating 
Positive change 
High impact 
Medium impact 
Status quo  
Low impact 
No impact  
Negative change Negative impact 
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Relative to other ecosystem services, a wide range of primary valuation studies related to aquatic ecosystems 
is available (Markandya, 2016), which allows for benefit transfer for most of the impacts. Databases such as 
the Environmental Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI) or the TEEB Valuation Database provide a useful 
overview of various options in this regard, for instance in terms of what studies are available, and how to 
allocate unit values to the respective ecosystem services. To include the most suitable values, and to reduce 
the potential transfer errors which may occur due to transferring from too dissimilar sites (Kaul et al., 2013), 
the following priorities were set to identify and select valuation studies: similar site in (1) the same country, 
(2) in one of the other MIRACLE case study countries3, and (3) in a country within the Baltic Sea Region. This 
information is summarized in Table 10. 
 
Table 10 Monetary benefit values (before and after transfer) 
                                                          
3 Germany, Poland, Latvia and Sweden 
Ecosystem Services Benefit Original Unit Value 
Transferred Unit 
Value (to Berze) 
Transferred Value 
(to Helge) 
Source 
Biodiversity/habitat 
preservation 
High number of different 
species of plants and 
animals, their 
population levels, 
number of different 
habitats and their size in 
the river ecosystem in 
the next 10 years 
4.6 Zloty 
[2007]/household/month 
 
8.7 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
246.0 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Birol et al. 
(2008) 
Habitat for endangered 
and protected species 
(Forest) 
8.0 EUR 
[2004]/person/year 
not used 
129.5 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Meyerhoff et 
al. (2009) 
Landscape diversity 
(Forest) 
4.6 [2004]/person/year not used 
14.2 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Species diversity (Forest) 12.5 [2004]/person/year not used 
190.3 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Provision of food 
 
Recreation/tourism 
 
Biodiversity 
Improve fish variety 
from “moderate” to 
“very high” 
42.2 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
15.8 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
543.8 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Ek and 
Persson 
(2016) 
Improve fish variety 
from “moderate” to 
“high” 
25.5 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
9.6 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
329.3 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Change fish variety from 
“moderate” to low” 
-287.6 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
-107.6 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
-3709.8 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Non-use value of salmon 
passing fish ladders 
(salmon increase 
between 1000 – 6000 
per year) 
51.0 SEK 
[2004]/person/year 
2.2 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
77.2 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Håkansson 
(2009) 
Access to the riverbank 
for recreational purpose 
6.6 Zloty 
[2007]/household/month 
12.5   EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
352.9 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Birol et al. 
(2008) 
Flood risk reduction 
Reduce flood risk from 
“high” to “low” 
14.5 Zloty 
[2007]/household/month 
 
27.4 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
775.4 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Surface water quality 
 
Erosion/sediment 
control 
 
Recreation/tourism 
Erosion prevention of 
grassland 
49.0 Dollar 
[2007]/ha/year  
15.72 EUR 
[2016]/ha/year 
541.87 SEK 
[2016]/ha/year de Groot et 
al. (2012)  Erosion prevention of 
woodlands 
13.0 Dollar 
[2007]/ha/year  
not used 
143.8 SEK 
[2016]/ha/year 
Improve water clarity 
from "moderate" to 
"clear" 
106.4 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
35.1 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
1347.1 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Ek and 
Persson 
(2016) 
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Applying the Net Present Value Test  
To account for time preferences of individuals and following national official recommendations, a social 
discount rate of 5 % is used for Berze River catchment (Ministry of Finance Latvia, 2016), and 3.5 % for Helge 
River catchment (Swedish Transport Administration, 2016). While the baseline strategies result in negative 
NPVs in both cases, all suggested strategies for improving water quality show higher benefit-cost ratios (BCR) 
and, except of Strategy 2a and 2b in the Berze River catchment, a positive NPV4.  
 
Table 11 and Table 12 give an idea about the distributional impacts of implementing possible measures relative 
to the baseline. Assuming that (a) no support mechanisms exist (as for instance the EU payments for some 
baseline measures), and (b) the respective land owning or controlling group must bear all costs related to a 
measure, it becomes evident that costs and benefits are not experienced by the same actors. For example, 
Strategy 3 (“Hydropower”) for the Berze River catchment shows by far the highest BCR. However, while the 
hydropower sector is assumed to be responsible for all costs related to establishing fish ladders, the respective 
actors gain little, if at all, from the resulting benefits due to improved biodiversity, recreation or tourism. 
Furthermore, the CBA results reveal the challenges in terms of potential conflicts amongst the different actor 
groups when it comes to agreeing on a single strategy. In the case of the Helge River catchment, the 
agricultural sector must bear the largest share of the costs in Strategy 1 (“River”), while this applies to the 
forestry sector if Strategy 2 (“Forest”) would be implemented. Although some re-distribution/compensation 
mechanism might be implemented, this breakdown of the costs and benefits sheds light on the complexity of 
distributional effects which occur when implementing measures to improve environmental problems. The 
strategies produce both losers and winners from a welfare economics point of view, even when NPV>0.   
 
The bottom-up CBA results not only expose the cost and benefit implications of implementing strategies but 
also the potential weaknesses of this process. For instance, the stakeholders were not constrained by a 
financial budget. Strategy 2 (“Forest”) for the Helge River catchment illustrates the resulting issue clearly. 
While the total benefits of Strategy 2 are the highest, its total costs exceed the costs of Strategy 1 (“River”) by 
a factor of almost 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 In a sensitivity analysis, we found that the signs of the NPV of all strategies do not change if the time period is 
extended to 2050 and 2100, or the social discount rate is changed to any value between 0 and 25 %, ceteris paribus.  
 
Change of water clarity 
from “moderate” to 
“turbid and coloured” 
-199.8 SEK 
[2014]/person/month 
-67.2 EUR 
[2016]/person/year 
-2577.9 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Surface and 
groundwater quality 
(Ecological status) 
Benefits of Nitrogen (N) 
and Phosphorus (P) 
reduction 
10.5 EUR (1995)/kg N 
reduction 
21.3 EUR (2016)/kg 
N reduction 
190.0 SEK 
[2016]/person/year 
Interwies et 
al. (2012) 
based on 
Turner et al. 
(1999) 
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Table 11 Costs and Benefits Summary5, Helge river catchment (Present Value (PV) in million SEK, 3.5 % social discount rate) 
Costs and Benefits Baseline  
(2017 – 2030) 
Strategy 1 “River” 
(2021 – 2030) 
Strategy 2 “Forest” 
(2021 – 2030) 
Total costs 854.77 328.06 1,868.96 
Total benefits 264.54 2,541.00  3,297.56  
 
Costs to    
   Agricultural sector not applicable 256.28 0 
   Forestry sector not applicable 0          1,754.58 
   Hydropower sector not applicable 0             114.38  
   Others not applicable 71.77  0 
 
Benefit    
Biodiversity/habitat Preservation                                  -                565.29              776.06 
Flood risk reduction                                  -                                    -                761.92 
Erosion/sediment control                                  -                                    -                     2.43 
Recreation and tourism                                  -                 346.81              422.64 
Surface and groundwater quality 264.54              305.18                10.77 
Reduced water colouration                                  -            1,323.73          1,323.73 
 
NPV 519.23 2,212.95 1,428.59  
BCR 0.31 7.75 1.76 
 
Table 12 Cost and Benefits Summary, Berze river catchment (PV in million Euro, 5.0 % social discount rate) 
Costs and Benefits Baseline  
(2017 – 2030) 
Strategy 1 
“WWTP” 
(2021 – 2030) 
Strategy 2a 
“Agriculture” 
(2021 – 2030) 
Strategy 2b 
“Agriculture”  
(2021 – 2030) 
Strategy 3 
“Hydropower” 
(2021 – 2030) 
Total costs 28.33 0.36 35.32 34.92  0.41 
Total benefits 11.22 0.69 32.25 29.89 6.92 
 
Costs to      
   Agricultural sector not applicable 0 35.32 34.92 0 
   Hydropower sector not applicable 0.36 0 0 0.41 
 
Benefit      
Biodiversity/habitat 
preservation 
- - 4.32  3.22 4.32 
Flood risk reduction - - 4.84 4.24 - 
Erosion/sediment 
control 
10.34 - 0.08 0.06 - 
Recreation and tourism - - 2.20 2.20 2.59 
Surface and 
groundwater quality 
0.88 0.69                          20.80 20.16 - 
 
NPV -17.11 0.33 -3.07 -5.03 6.51 
BC ratio 0.40 1.91 0.91 0.86 17.1 
 
 
  
                                                          
5 The full CBA spreadsheets are available from the authors upon request. 
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5 EXPERIENCES GAINED FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
 
Were the “Conditions for Use” for bottom-up CBA met? 
Earlier in the paper we set out three conditions which we argued should be met if a full-scale application of 
bottom-up CBA was warranted. These conditions were (i) no pre-defined choices (ii) identification of relevant 
stakeholders and (iii) representative scale. The Water Framework Directive emphasises public participation 
and does not dictate pre-defined measures, so that the first condition is fulfilled. Stakeholders in both case 
study areas could decide upon strategies to improve water quality in their respective river catchment without 
any restrictions apart from the requirement for every strategy to be capable of achieving such improvements. 
The CBA results also reveal that setting some restrictions such as financial budget constraints might be 
reasonable to improve the likelihood of integrating the outcomes in actual policy making.  
 
The second condition is more difficult to answer. Whilst the underlying environmental problem determined 
the selection of stakeholders in both case studies, and the included actors certainly match the definition of 
affecting or being affected by either inadequate water quality or prospective changes in water quality, 
completeness is uncertain. However, allowing that (1) stakeholders could continuously be added, (2) spatial 
and demographic differences were considered, and (3) actors from the public sector, civil society and private 
sector were represented, the likelihood of having overlooked important stakeholders is minimal. Yet, for 
instance the high share of public sector participants of centralised institutions in the Berze River case study 
may have caused the suggestion of rather conventional measures, compared to the strategies in Helge River, 
where the stakeholder groups appeared to be more balanced and consisted mainly of decentralised 
institutions.  
 
Choosing an appropriate scale is the third condition for the bottom-up CBA. The Helge River represents a share 
of 0.39 %, and the Berze River 0.04 % of the rivers’ water inflow to the Baltic Sea. In terms of nutrient flows, 
the choice of setting the geographical and hydrological river catchments as system boundaries thus ensures 
that impacts outside the system boundaries may be considered marginal. However, due to the 
interconnectedness and complexity of both environmental systems and ecosystem services (Stosch et al., 
2017), it is difficult to estimate the relevance of additional physical impacts beyond the catchment level. An 
indication can be given by the values held by people for the consequences of water quality improvements. For 
instance, the wetland area “Kristianstad Vattenrike”, which is partly situated in the Helge catchment, is a 
preserved UNESCO Biosphere reserve with “landscapes and biological values of regional, national and 
international importance” (UNESCO, 2011) and various endangered or rare species (UNESCO, 2006). This is 
indicative of significant values being held by society outside the river catchment. The total benefits from the 
implementation of water quality improvement measures are thus likely to be under-represented in the 
outcome of the bottom-up CBA.  
 
Integration of local knowledge  
The integration of local knowledge can be observed in both case study areas, and at different stages of the 
CBA process. Due to the explicit consideration of local stakeholder suggestions, the analysed strategies are 
generally perceived as practicable and shaped by local knowledge in terms of feasibility and costs. However, 
while the additional and specific knowledge input is likely to improve the output quality of the CBA, 
uncertainties regarding some costs and the actual impacts remain. We now consider local knowledge 
integration under 4 headings: pressures, strategies, costs and impacts. 
 
19 
 
Pressures: The integration of additional local knowledge into the process became evident during the 
identification of the relevant pressure. Nutrient pollution and flooding were initially expected to be the main 
pressures in both catchments. However, based on the perception of affected stakeholders, the regulation of 
the river flow was additionally identified as problematic in Berze River. Water colouration6 appeared to be the 
dominant issue in Helge River with the widest negative impact on various actors.  
 
Strategies: Measures in both case areas were added, removed or revised throughout the CBA process. In 
general, the strategies in Berze consist of rather conventional measures with a focus on their exact location 
and scope. By contrast, measures suggested in Helge River consist additionally of innovative measures which 
are not yet implemented in the area, such as riparian zones or wetlands in forest landscapes. In the Berze River 
case, an example in which local knowledge turned out to be particularly valuable was in developing strategies 
to reduce point-source pollution. The performance of the existing WWTPs was seen as insufficient so that an 
upgrade and the connection to remaining households was initially suggested. This, however, was identified as 
irrelevant after further stakeholder investigations which detected that further upgrades would not be 
technically feasible. Consequently, outdated and underperforming WWTPs were identified and suggested to 
be renewed, as evidenced by strategy 1 (“WWTP”).  
 
Costs: Stakeholders appeared to have a good understanding of possible costs of the strategies, either based 
on own or their networks’ knowledge. In the Helge River case, where existing cost information of innovative 
measures was largely unavailable due to a lacking experience, stakeholders could for instance indicate the 
opportunity costs in terms of respective land prices or gross margins in areas where the implementation would 
be feasible. While this allows for making qualified approximations, investment or administration costs in such 
cases often remain uncertain.  
 
Impacts: Local stakeholders had a clear understanding of what impacts in terms of changes to ecosystem 
services they wanted to achieve, yet had different opinions on how to achieve them. Generally, provisioning 
services, such as the supply of water, food or energy, shape the national and global priorities when managing 
water catchments, which often comes at a costs of reduced water quality, ecosystem functioning or resilience 
(Ormerod et al., 2010; Stosch et al., 2017). The local stakeholders, however, identified ecosystem services as 
being relevant which (1) go beyond the supply of provisioning services and thus purely economic interests 
(e.g. by addressing and stressing the importance of biodiversity, habitat preservation or recreation), and (2) 
play an important role at a local level, yet appear to be of less priority to national policy-making (e.g. water 
clarity). The case studies thus confirm the findings of Stosch et al. (2017), who conclude that stakeholders may 
both identify the hidden costs of neglecting some services in management strategies and suggest solutions 
which consider multiple ecosystem services going beyond the supply of provisioning services only. This is also 
in line with Dick et al. (2018, p. 553), who state that the ecosystem service approach’s “operational influence 
on practice is seldom reported”.  
 
Stakeholder dialogue 
By converting complex data sets and connections into easily interpretable outcomes, the bottom-up CBA 
supported dialogue in both case studies, by highlighting the importance of considering multiple benefits and 
revealing how assumptions and uncertainties influence outcomes. By developing a dynamic, spreadsheet-
based CBA template which could be altered during stakeholder meetings, stakeholders could discuss possible 
                                                          
6 also referred to as “brownification“ (e.g. Tuvendal & Elmqvist, 2011) 
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outcomes of the strategies by means of changing the working assumptions, such as the size of benefits, time 
horizons, physical impacts, or costs and scopes of measures. Using CBA to foster discussions did not necessarily 
lead to agreement being reached amongst the stakeholders in terms of best practices; different views remain. 
In Helge River, actions to restore a natural river flow were intended to promote biodiversity, yet an opposing 
group acknowledged that changing the flow might be counterproductive, as biodiversity-rich grassland areas 
could be flooded. As evidence regarding the precise biodiversity effects was not available, the bottom-up CBA 
was unable to produce decisive recommendations, but supported dialogue by presenting and contrasting 
existing valuations of grassland and river biodiversity, as well as values of additional benefits emerging due to 
river restoration or keeping grasslands (e.g. de Groot et al., 2012). The CBA process was not able to shed light 
on every disagreement nor provide evidence for the optimal solution, but discussions and concerns of 
stakeholders around these uncertainties illuminated key issues which policy makers should consider when 
considering or promoting certain measures.  
 
Acceptance and implementation 
Although bottom-up CBA may increase the acceptance of implementing certain measures, stakeholders 
resisted some of the measures discussed on grounds of cost. The willingness to implement costly strategies 
goes hand in hand with two factors, namely compensation and the demand for evidence. Compensation 
usually needs to fully cover the expenses of the implementation and maintenance of any implemented 
measure, including administrative costs and lost incomes. Otherwise the uptake of measures is unlikely. This 
is exemplified by buffer strips in the Berze River catchment, which, although seen as appropriate and 
beneficial, are not implemented on a broad scale due to insufficient payments. Interestingly, some 
stakeholders took the view that the required compensation must not necessarily be of monetary nature, but 
could be achieved by different means. For example, the forestry sector in Helge indicated a willingness to allow 
forest areas to be flooded, if, in exchange, fish ladders (by-passes) are installed at hydropower plants. 
 
Compensation is however not the only requirement to reach a willingness to implement measures. The Helge 
River case revealed the demand for more evidence. The forestry sector is seen by most stakeholder groups as 
a main source of organic matter discharge to the river, yet evidence on what really causes water colouration 
is missing. While stakeholders of the forest sector expressed willingness to implement measures, as pictured 
in strategy 2 (“Forest”), they also required scientific proof that these measures would really result in positive 
impacts.  
 
In conclusion, even when a bottom-up CBA raises acceptance by showing that social benefits of a certain 
strategy would outweigh the costs, non-coercive implementation remains unlikely if private costs exceed 
private benefits unless compensated from the social surplus. Hence, actual redistribution mechanisms which 
go beyond the “possibility of compensation” idea encapsulated by the Kaldor-Hicks tests need to be 
considered. In addition, research suggests that the implementation of agri-environmental measures might be 
compromised due to farmers’ concerns over social disapproval for being paid for “doing nothing” – as might 
be seen to be the case with land retirement to reduce nutrient pollution (Burton et al., 2008). Working with 
bottom-up CBA might lead to a change of perceptions of stakeholders by highlighting the positive impacts of 
such measures. This could lead to an increased willingness to implement voluntary environmental measures.  
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6 PERSPECTIVES ON THE APPROACHES: BOTTOM-UP, TOP-DOWN OR BOTH?  
The case studies suggest that bottom-up CBA supports participatory processes, and generates additional local 
knowledge beyond existing information, which may serve as input to facilitate better and more well-informed 
decision-making. The remaining question is when the bottom-up CBA approach should be applied, and under 
which circumstances the top-down CBA, or a combination of both methods can be beneficial.  
 
From the welfare economics perspective, the interpretation of bottom-up CBA outcomes is in fact equal to 
that of top-down approaches, since it simply re-applies the Kaldor-Hicks test to a differently-defined group of 
winners and losers. Furthermore, when it comes to monetary valuation, the use of social discount rates or the 
calculation of NPV, the outcome of bottom-up CBA is likely to entail similar uncertainties to a top-down CBA. 
What differs is who suggests the strategies to be assessed, and who decides what should be considered as 
relevant for the welfare of the respective society. Contrary to the conventional top-down approach, bottom-
up CBA leaves these decisions to local and directly affected stakeholders.  
 
The choice of which approach should be applied thus depends on the aim of what should be appraised. If the 
intention is to assess how social welfare is affected by an already-defined set of projects or policies, a top-
down CBA must be used. Alternatively, if the intention is to generate strategies to address a specific 
environmental problem, where strategies should represent the preferences and incorporate the unique 
knowledge of local stakeholders the bottom-up approach should be used.  
 
However, while accounting for spatial and temporal scales (mentioned by Wegner and Pascual (2011) as one 
limitation of using CBA in the context of ecosystem services), applying bottom-up CBA also entails that the 
benefits of changes in the provision of ecosystem services are only picked up when local stakeholders perceive 
them as relevant. On the one hand, this can increase the likelihood of incorporating and revealing locally 
relevant values, which may otherwise be neglected or considered too marginal when focusing on national or 
regional impacts in a top-down CBA. In this way, the outcome is, at least to some extent, more likely to be 
relevant to, and thus accepted by, local people, which is not necessarily the case for environmental policies 
developed by top-down experts (Carr, 2002; Smith, 2008). Supporting examples may for instance be the issue 
of insufficient water clarity in the Helge River case study, or the fact that cultural ecosystem services are often 
disregarded (e.g. Queiroz et al., 2017). On the other hand, the consideration of local and case-specific impacts 
may limit the transferability of the bottom-up CBA outcome, such as the strategies or specific ecosystem 
services perceived as being important in one location, which may well be different from those seen as 
important in another.  
 
Due to assessing values for different populations and thus generating different findings, top-down and 
bottom-up CBA are not mutually exclusive. By providing local insights, bottom-up CBA can deliver 
complementary information for decision-makers, supporting and increasing the quality of top-down CBAs, 
which may be required when it comes to projects or policies affecting a larger scale. For instance, Hanley and 
Black (2006) found that benefits of implementing the Water Framework Directive in Scotland generally 
outweigh the costs, but also indicate hotspots: Impact, cost and benefit estimates were shaped by a high 
degree of uncertainty, possibly induced by varying ecological and socioeconomic factors in large-scale analysis. 
By providing local information, the bottom-up approach can v reduce possible conflicts and provide more 
information on locally-relevant aspects of benefits and costs.  
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If input variables and outcomes across both approaches do not match, the CBAs will transparently point out 
where the assumptions differ, which may increase the understanding of discrepancies amongst external 
decision-makers and local stakeholders. In such cases, two possible scenarios emerge for decision-makers who 
draw on findings of both approaches: On the one hand, stakeholders’ perceptions may turn out as reasonable 
and should therefore be, in one way or another, accounted for. This can either be achieved by adapting the 
projects or policies which are assessed in the top-down approach to better match local preferences; or by 
using the newly generated information to develop compensation, support or taxation schemes. On the other 
hand, stakeholders’ perceptions may be distorted, for instance due to neglecting budget constraints or 
variables which affect wider societal welfare. This information can inform decision-makers as to where to raise 
awareness or counter possible misinformation, such as relevant costs or benefits the stakeholders are not 
considering or aware of. This in turn may increase the societal acceptance of new policies or projects. If all 
input variables in both CBA approaches are similar, and yet the outcome is not, applying both approaches 
gives further indications on distributional effects. The sub-set of society represented by the bottom-up CBA 
may lose (or win) due to implementing a certain strategy, whilst the wider society represented by the top-
down CBA, may gain (or lose).   
 
7 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A bottom-up CBA is a beneficial approach to generate and assess strategies which represent the preferences 
of local stakeholders and address a given environmental problem. A bottom-up CBA represents a useful 
complement to a conventional top-down CBA, as it assesses different populations of concern, and thus 
generates different insights. Since it draws on many of the same economic principles as top-down CBA (such 
as monetary valuation and social discounting), the bottom-up CBA delivers insights which can be incorporated 
within a broader CBA analysis. The advantages of bottom-up CBA go beyond the assessment of perceived costs 
and benefits of strategies addressing an environmental problem. As the evaluated strategies are formulated 
within and adapted to the context of local conditions, and as both the strategies and the impacts represent 
the preferences and the perception of the local society, policy-makers gain valuable information of what 
measures may be feasible and which impacts are perceived as important. This additional knowledge can be 
used to adjust top-down policies, improve support or tax mechanisms, or to raise social awareness in terms of 
important yet neglected impacts, costs or benefits. Moreover, bottom-up CBA can support participative 
environmental planning by fostering stakeholder dialogue and increasing acceptance, for instance by 
increasing transparency in decision-making, and by contributing to making their outcomes more valid from a 
political perspective. 
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